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FIFTH AMENDMENT-THE
APPLICABILITY OF THE ASSERTION
OF THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL TO
UNRELATED INVESTIGATIONS
Arizona v. Roberson, 108 S. Ct. 2093 (1988).
I.

INTRODUCTION

In Arizona v. Roberson I the Supreme Court considered whether a
criminal defendant's assertion of the right to counsel during the investigation of one crime should apply to a subsequent interrogation
made regarding a separate investigation. 2 The Court concluded
that, due to the inherently compelling nature of custodial interrogation, once a subject asserts his 3 right to counsel, the police may not
4
approach him again on any matter until he has seen an attorney.
The subject may, however, initiate further contact with the authorities himself prior to consulting a lawyer. 5
This Note argues that the Court in Roberson imposed an unnecessary and unwarranted restriction on police officials. This Note argues that: Roberson created an unjustified expansion of the rule of
Edwards v. Arizona ;6 that the Court overemphasized the importance
of clarity in rules regulating interrogations and misplaced that emphasis; and that the Court unjustifiably presumed to know the minds
of custodial subjects.
This Note further argues that both the majority opinion and the
dissent incorrectly applied the holding of Michigan v. Mosley, 7 the
Court's only previous decision on the applicability of the assertion
of the privilege against self-incrimination to separate cases. This
Note asserts that in distinguishing the right to counsel from the
1 108 S. Ct. 2093 (1988).
2 Id. at 2096.
3 The words "his," "him," and "he" are used in the generic, not gender-specific,
sense throughout this Note.
4 Id. at 2098.
5 Id.
6 451 U.S. 477 (1981). See infra note 63 and accompanying text for a discussion of
Edwards and the Court's holding in that case.
7 423 U.S. 96 (1975). See infra note 60 for a discussion of Mosley and the Court's
holding in that case.
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right to silence, and establishing different rules of applicability in
separate investigations, the Court in Roberson unnecessarily complicated the rules of custodial interrogation rather than clarified them.
This Note concludes that the Court selected a case unrepresentative of proper interrogation procedure, and from it promulgated an overly restrictive rule. This Note further concludes that
the Court might have adopted a more flexible rule which would address problems of procedural error, such as occurred in Roberson,
without barring the legitimate investigative technique of interrogation altogether following an assertion of the right to counsel.
II.

BACKGROUND

The fifth amendment 8 guarantees to every citizen the privilege
against self-incrimination in criminal proceedings. 9 Seeking to better secure this privilege for subjects of custodial interrogation,' 0 the
Supreme Court delivered a landmark decision in Miranda v. Arizona 1 which established strict guidelines governing both police procedure in custodial questioning and the admissibility of evidence
derived from such interrogations.' 2 In an opinion authored by
ChiefJustice Warren, the Court summarized its Miranda holding by
stating that "the prosecution may not use statements whether exculpatory or inculpatory, stemming from custodial interrogation of the
defendant, unless it demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards
8 The fifth amendment states, in pertinent part, that "[n]o person.., shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself." U.S. CONST. amend. V.
9 Id.
10 "Custodial interrogation" occurs when officials attempt to obtain statements from
a defendant questioned while in police custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of
action in any significant way. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966). See infra
note 11 and accompanying text for a discussion of Miranda.
11 384 U.S. 436 (1966). Miranda represented a major effort by the Court to examine
the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination and how custodial proceedings
affect that right. The Court considered four cases of relative similarity. In Miranda, a
suspect confessed to murder and rape after two hours of interrogation. Id. at 491. The
suspect's written confession contained a type-written clause which declared that he had
confessed voluntarily and with full knowledge of his rights. Id. at 492. The Court reversed the conviction, rejecting the validity of such clauses and holding that subjects
must be personally informed of their constitutional rights. Id. at 492.
The Court reached a similar conclusion in the three companion cases. In Vignera v.
New York, the Court reversed a conviction where the trial court had refused to consider
whether the suspect, arrested for robbery, had been advised of his rights prior to interrogation. Id. at 493-94. Likewise, in Westover v. United States, the Court reversed a
conviction, pointing to the failure of the police to advise the subject of his rights and to
the coercive nature of the interrogation, which lasted for fourteen hours. Id. at 494-497.
Finally, in California v. Stewart, the Court upheld a suppression order granted on the
ground that the police had not informed the suspect of his rights. Id. at 497-99.
12 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444.
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effective to secure the privilege against self-incrimination." '1 3
To demonstrate the need for the rule promulgated by the
Court in Miranda, ChiefJustice Warren began by examining the recent history of the methods employed by the police in interrogations.14 The Chief Justice described the progression from physical
coercion, which had been the norm into the twentieth century, to
the modem use of psychological tricks to obtain confessions.' 5 The
Chief Justice followed this analysis with a brief look at the privilege
against self-incrimination, a privilege which originated in ancient
times and developed into a principle of law defining "the proper
scope of governmental power over a citizen."' 16 In view of the longstanding existence of the privilege against self-incrimination as a
principle of law and the threat posed to it by the "inherently compelling pressures"'17 of custodial interrogation, the Court was determined in Miranda to. restrict the actions of police interrogators. 18
The Miranda restrictions took the form of a requirement that all
subjects of custodial questioning must be advised of their rights
prior to any interrogation by the police. 19 The Court enumerated
those rights as the right to remain silent and the right to have coun20
sel present at any interrogation.
The Court based its requirement that subjects be informed of
their right to counsel on the coercive nature of custodial interrogation, observing that such pressure might induce a subject to forego
the privilege against self-incrimination, were that privilege supported only by the right to silence. 2 ' Informing subjects of their
right to counsel and allowing them recourse to such, the Court rea'3

Id.

14 The ChiefJustice wrote that "an understanding of the nature and depth of this in-

custody interrogation is essential to our discussion today." Id. at 445.
15 The ChiefJustice pointed to studies conducted in the 1930's which verified the use
of physical coercion to extract confessions. Id. at 445-46. The ChiefJustice noted that
such activity had continued into the 1960's, albeit with less frequency. Id. at 446. Chief
Justice Warren then turned his attention to the more modern practice of psychological
coercion, noting the use of manuals detailing effective questioning techniques, and their
emphasis on privacy, presumption of guilt, perseverance and trickery. Id.
16 Id. at 460.
17 Id. at 467.
18 Id.
19 Id.
20 Id. at 467-469. As a corollary to the right to remain silent, the Court required that
all subjects must receive a specific warning that should they choose to forego that right,
anything which they might say could later be used against them in court. Id. at 469.
21 Id. The sixth amendment states that "[iun all criminal prosecutions, the accused
shall have the right.., to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defense." U.S. CONST.
AMEND.
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soned, would serve to better protect their fifth amendment right. 2 2
The Court found added benefit in the possibility that the presence
of a subject's lawyer might discourage attempts by the authorities to
coerce a confession. 23 To grant subjects the fullest opportunity to
assert the right to counsel, the Court declined to limit the effectiveness of such requests to the pre-interrogation period,2 4 and emphasized that subjects must specifically waive their right rather than
simply fail to assert it.25 The Court sought to ensure that all subjects should enjoy the right to counsel by requiring that subjects
unable to secure or afford the services of an attorney would receive
the benefit of counsel at government expense. 26 The Court then
underscored its position on the requirement that authorities must
inform subjects of their right to counsel by noting that "[i]f the interrogation continues without the presence of an attorney, and a
statement is taken, a heavy burden rests on the government to
demonstrate that the defendant knowingly and intelligently waived
his privilege against self-incrimination and his right to retained or
27
appointed counsel."
Miranda created a system of warnings which police must provide to custodial subjects prior to any questioning. 28 These warnings are commonly referred to as Miranda rights. 29 Chief Justice
Warren's summary of the holding of Miranda incorporated the traditional phrasing of Miranda rights. He stated:
We hold that when an individual is taken into custody or otherwise
deprived of his freedom by the authorities in any significant way and is
subjected to questioning, then the privilege against self-incrimination
is jeopardized. Procedural safeguards must be employed to protect
the privilege, and unless other fully effective means are adopted to
notify the person of his right to silence and to assure that the exercise
of the right will be scrupulously honored, the following measures are
required. He must be warned prior to any questioning that he has the
right to remain silent, that anything he says can be used against him in
a court of law, that he has the right to the presence of an attorney, and
if he cannot afford an attorney one will be appointed to him prior to
any questioning if he so desires. Opportunity to exercise these rights
must be afforded him throughout the interrogation. After such warnings have been given, and such opportunity afforded him, the individual may knowingly and intelligently waive these rights and agree to
22
23
24
25
26

Miranda, 384 U.S. at 469-70.
Id. at 470.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 472-73.

27
28

Id. at 475.
Id. at 478-79.

29

Id.
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answer questions or make a statement. But unless and until such
warnings and waiver are demonstrated by the prosecution at trial, no
evidence
obtained as a result of interrogation can be used against
30
him.
Although somewhat controversial at the time of its adoption by
the Court, 3 ' the Miranda decision created a framework for interrogations which remains substantially unchanged today. Since the Miranda rule was established, the Court has on numerous occasions
considered Miranda's language and its applicability to diverse
situations.
The Court has generally read the language of Miranda narrowly,
occasionally restricting significant terms to very precise meanings.
In Fare v. Michael C.,32 the Court defined "counsel" to refer specifically to an attorney. 3 3 Similarly, in Rhode Island v. Innis,34 the Court
defined "interrogation" precisely as refering "not only to express

questioning but also to any words on the part of the police (other
than those normally attendant to arrest and custody) that the police
should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response
from the subject." 35 In Oregon v. Bradshaw3 6 the Court declined to
30 Id. (citations omitted).
31 The ChiefJustice addressed

some of the anticipated criticism within the opinion.

The Chief Justice rejected the idea that society's need for effective interrogation outweighs the individual privilege against self-incrimination, stating that, "[t]hat right cannot be abridged." Id. at 479. To support the assertion that the rule of Miranda would
not unduly hinder police procedure, ChiefJustice Warren pointed to the F.B.I.'s traditional use of warnings similar to those enunciated in Miranda, and that organization's
"exemplary record of effective law enforcement." Id. at 483.
32 442 U.S. 707 (1979). Fare concerned a juvenile's request to see his probation officer rather than an attorney. The request was denied and the juvenile confessed to the
charge of murder during the interrogation. Id. at 711. The Court rejected thejuvenile's
petition that his confession be suppressed because a request to see one's probation officer does not constitute an assertion of the right to an attorney. Id. at 727-28.
33 Id. at 719. The Court noted that the right to counsel rule in Miranda was based on
"this Court's perception that the lawyer occupies a critical position in our legal system
because of his unique ability to protect the Fifth Amendment rights of a client undergoing custodial interrogation." Id.
34 446 U.S. 291 (1980). In Innis a man arrested for murder asserted his right to
counsel but then told police where to find the murder weapon while in transport to the
police station. Id. at 294-95. The subject revealed the whereabouts of the weapon in
response to a conversation between the transporting officers who speculated on the consequences should a child find the weapon before the police did. Id. The Court declined
to find that the conversation between the two policemen constituted "interrogation."
Id. at 300-02.
35 Id. at 301. The Court further clarified its definition, stating that "[a] practice
which the police should know is reasonably likely to evoke an incriminating response
from a suspect thus amounts to interrogation." Id.
36 462 U.S. 1039 (1983). Bradshaw concerned a man who asked to speak to a lawyer,
then initiated a conversation with a police officer as to how the police would proceed.
Id. at 1042. The man subjected himself to a lie detector test at the officer's suggestion,

1988]

INTERROGATIONS

provide a precise definition of "initiation" of further conversation
by the subject,3 7 but did exclude remarks on the part of the subject
"relating to routine incidents of the custodial relationship." '3 8 Similarly, in Berhemer v. McCarty3 9 the Court did not specifically define
"custody" but did exclude situations involving detainment of a subject by the police which were not "police-dominated." 40 The
Court's habit of interpreting the language of Miranda narrowly reflects the belief, as noted in Berkemer, that "[o]ne of the principle
advantages of the doctrine that suspects must be given warnings
before being interrogated while in custody is the clarity of that
4
rnle." 1
While the Court has established a record of construing the language of Miranda narrowly, it has not developed a specific pattern in
applying Miranda to diverse situations. Instead, the Court has generally focused on the specific issues in the individual cases in clarifying the Miranda doctrine. The Court has addressed the issue of a
subject's valid waiver of his rights on several occasions. In Michigan
v. Tucker 4 2 the Court held a waiver valid although the subject received only a partial set of warnings. 43 In Connecticut v. Barrett,44 the
at the conclusion of which he confessed to the crime. Id. The Court held that the man
had initiated further contact, noting that the arresting officer clearly indicated such by
warning the man that the man did not have to talk to the officer. Id. at 1046.
37 Id. at 1045. The Court commented that, "we doubt that it would be desirable to
build a superstructure of legal refinements around the word 'initiate'." Id.
38 Id.
39 468 U.S. 420. Berkemer presented the situation of a man pulled over for a routine
traffic violation. When the policeman stopped him, the man made incriminating statements indicating that he had been driving while under the influence of alcohol and marijuana. Id. at 423. The police officer formally arrested the man and took him in for blood
tests, but at no time did he advise the man of his rights under Miranda. Id. The Court
held that the man's statements must be suppressed and declined to draw a distinction
between misdemeanor and felony-related custody with regard to the Miranda rule. Id. at
429, 431-32. The Court noted that to draw such a distinction would create, "an elaborate set of rules, interlaced with exceptions and subtle dictinctions, discriminating between different kinds of custodial interrogations." Id. at 432.
40 Id. at 439. The Court did exempt situations where the police only detained a subject briefly, for example in situations like traffic violations, noting that the chance for
coercion was lessened when the subject was in public view. Id. at 438.
41 Id. at 430.
42 417 U.S. 433 (1974). Tucker involved a man who was arrested for rape and confessed to the crime. The defense later sought to suppress a witness' testimony. Id. at
437. The prosecution learned of the witness from remarks made by the defendant, who
had not received a full set of Miranda warnings because police had not informed him of
the provision of counsel for the indigent. Id. at 438. The Court declined to suppress the
witness' testimony, noting that the defendant's remarks had not been coerced; neither
had they been admitted into evidence, tainting the actual trial. Id. at 449.
43 Id. In reaching its decision, the Court noted that "[j]ust as the law does not require that a defendant receive a perfect trial, only a fair one, it cannot realistically require that policemen investigating serious crimes make no errors whatsoever. . ..
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Court considered a related situation, here holding valid a subject's
partial waiver of rights. 4 5 The Court also considered three cases
which involved the scope of the waiver of rights. In Wyrick v.
Fields,4 6 the Court held that a waiver of rights for the purpose of a
polygraph exam might extend to conversation immediately following the exam.4 7 Similarly, in Colorado v. Spring,48 the Court held
valid a waiver of rights even though interrogators included issues
unknown to the subject prior to his waiver. 49 In Moran v. Burbine,50
the Court upheld a waiver, rejecting a requirement that the police
Before we penalize police error, therefore, we must consider whether the sanction
serves a valid and useful purpose." Id. at 446.
44 479 U.S. 523 (1987). In Barrett, a man arrested on suspicion of sexual assault
agreed to speak without an attorney present but refused to sign anything. Id. at 525.
The Court emphasized that the subject had "made clear to police his willingness to talk
about the crime for which he was a suspect," and held that the oral statements need not
be suppressed because the subject had made only a partial request for counsel. Id. at
527-29.
45 Id. The Court also rejected the suggestion that the partial waiver indicated an
incomplete understanding of the consequences of a partial waiver on the part of the
defendant. Id. at 530.
46 459 U.S. 42 (1982). Wyrick concerned a man arrested for rape who requested a
polygraph examination. Advised of his rights before the test, the man afterwards made
incriminating remarks which he later sought to have suppressed. Id. at 44-45. Rejecting
the man's argument, the Court held that the statements made after the test were admissible because the man had been made aware of his rights and had voluntarily waived
them. Id. at 47. In particular, the Court noted that, "it would have been unreasonable
for Fields and his attorneys to assume that Fields would not be informed of the polygraph results and asked to explain any unfavorable result." Id.
47 Id. The Court rejected any contrary ruling as illogical, noting that, "the questions
put to Fields after the examination would not have caused him to forget the rights of
which he had been advised and which he had understood moments before." Id. at 49.
48 479 U.S. 564 (1987). Spring presented the case of a man arrested for illegal
purchase of firearms. When the man waived his right to counsel the police questioned
him not only about that crime but about a murder as well. Id. at 567. The man confessed to the murder but later moved to have the confession suppressed. Id. at 568.
The Court declined to affirm the suppression order, noting that the man's confession
was in no way coerced. Id. at 573-74. The Court further noted that, "there is no allegation that Spring failed to understand the basic privilege guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment. Nor is there any allegation that he mistook the consequences of speaking freely to
the law enforcement officials." Id. at 575.
49 Id. at 574. The Court pointed out that "[t]he Constitution does not require that a
criminal suspect know and understand every possible consequence of a waiver of the
Fifth Amendment privilege." Id.
50 475 U.S. 412 (1986). Moran involved a man arrested for breaking and entering
who was discovered to be wanted for murder in another city. The man submitted to
questioning in both cases, unaware that his sister was trying to obtain counsel for him,
and confessed to both crimes. Id. at 415. The Court declined to rule that the authorities
had an obligation to inform the man of his sister's efforts, noting that "[e]vents occurring outside of the presence of the suspect and entirely unknown to him surely can have
no bearing on the capacity to comprehend and knowingly relinquish a constitutional
right." Id. at 422.
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inform a subject of outsiders' efforts to obtain counsel for him. 5 '
Finally, in Smith v. Illinois,5 2 the Court drew a distinction between the
waiver and the invocation of Miranda rights, holding that a subject's
post-waiver responses might be used to determine the validity of the
waiver. 53
The Court has not limited its attention to the validity of waivers
of rights, but has interpreted the applicability of the Miranda doctrine to other issues as well. In New York v. Quarles54 the Court
crafted an exception to the rule barring the admission of any evidence obtained from statements made by the subject, prior to being
informed of his Miranda rights. 5 5 The Court held that the require56
ment might be dispensed with where public safety was concerned.
Oregon v. Elstad 57 presented the Court with a somewhat similar situa51 Id. The Court stated that "we have never read the Constitution to require that the
police supply a suspect with a flow of information to help him calibrate his self-interest
in deciding whether to speak or stand by his rights." Id.
52 469 U.S. 91 (1984). In Smith, a man arrested for armed robbery made a halting
request to see a lawyer, which his interrogators chose to ignore. Id. at 92. The Court
found the request to be unambiguous and ordered the confession suppressed. Id. The
Court noted that "[t]he courts below were able to construe Smith's request for counsel
as ambiguous' only by looking to Smith's subsequent responses to police questioning." Id.
at 97 (emphasis in original). The Court critcized this type of analysis as "unprecedented
and untenable." Id.
53 Id. at 100. The Court held that an accused's postrequest responses could not be
used to cast doubt on the clarity of the assertion of rights, and that "[s]uch subsequent
statements are relevant only to the distinct question of waiver." Id.
54 467 U.S. 649 (1984). Quarks concerned a man apprehended by the police for rape
and possession of a weapon. The subject answered a policeman's question as to the
location of the weapon before being read his rights. Id. at 652. The Court held that
such questioning was permissible in the interests of public safety, stating that "the need
for answers to questions in a situation posing a threat to public safety outweighs the
need for the prophylactic rule protecting the Fifth Amendment's privilege against selfincrimination." Id. at 657.
55 Id. The Court acknowleded that the Quarles decision might lessen the clarity of the
Miranda rule, but suggested that police officers "can and will distinguish almost instinctively between questions necessary to secure their own safety or the safety of the public
and questions designed solely to elicit testimonial evidence from a suspect." Id. at 658659.
56 Id. The Court noted that, "we do not believe that the doctrinal underpinnings of
Miranda require that it be applied in all its vigor to a situation in which police officers ask
questions reasonably prompted by a concern for the public safety." Id. at 656.
57 470 U.S. 298 (1985). Elstad presented the case of a man who was arrested in his
home on charges of burglary. The man made an incriminating statement before police
could advise him of his rights. Id. at 301. At the police station, he was read his rights
and again confessed. Id. He later sought to have both confessions suppressed. Id. at
302. The Court declined to hold the second confession tainted, and rejected the defendant's contention that knowledge of the authorities' awareness of the first confession
induced him to make the second at the station. Id. at 309. The Court held it
an unwarranted extension of Miranda to hold that a simple failure to administer the
warnings, unaccompanied by any actual coercion or other cicumstances calculated
to undermine the suspect's ability to excercise his free will, so taints the investiga-
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tion, involving a subject's voluntary confession prior to the administration of Miranda warnings, and the admissibility of statements
taken after the subject had been read his rights. 5 8 Here the Court
barred the pre-warning statements but admitted the evidence obtained after authorities had advised the subject of his rights. 59 In
Michigan v. Mosley 60 the Court again considered a situation involving
successive interrogations. But in Mosley, the interrogations involved
separate cases and the subject received the proper warnings, asserting his right to silence in the first interrogation but waiving his
rights in the second. 61 The Court declined to apply the assertion
from the first case to the second, holding that the authorities had
satisfied Miranda by observing the prescribed procedures. 62 These
three cases suggest a willingness on the part of the Court to examine particular situations to determine whether a subject's Miranda
rights have been accorded the proper respect.
3
The Court moved in a different direction in Edwards v. Arizona, 6
tory process that a subsequent voluntary and informed waiver is ineffective for some
indeterminate period.
Id.
58 Id. at 300-03. The Court noted that "[t]hough Mirandarequires that the unwarned
admission must be suppressed, the admissibility of any subsequent statement should
turn in these circumstances solely on whether it is knowingly and voluntarily made." Id.
at 309.
59 Id. at 318. The Court further noted that, "[t]his Court has never held that the
psychological impact of a voluntary disclosure of a guilty secret qualifies as state compulsion or compromises the voluntariness of a subsequent informed waiver." Id. at 312.
60 423 U.S. 96 (1975). Mosley involved a man arrested for robbery who refused to
answer questions when the police attempted to interrogate him. At a later time police
questioned him about a murder and obtained a confession. Id. at 98. The Court refused
to uphold a suppression order, stating that the police had legitimately re-initiated questioning on a separate matter after the passage of a significant period of time. Id. at 10607.
61 Id. The Court noted that "[a] review of the circumstances leading to Mosley's
confession reveals that his 'right to cut off questioning' was fully respected in this case."
Id. at 104.
62 Id. The Court particularly emphasized the proper adherence to the Miranda rule
on the part of the police, stating that:
[t]his is not a case, therefore, where the police failed to honor a decision of a person
in custody to cut off questioning, either by refusing to discontinue the interrogation
upon request or by persisting in repeated efforts to wear down his resistance or
make him change his mind. In contrast to such practices, the police here immediately ceased the interrogation, resumed questioning only after the passage of a significant period of time and the provision of a fresh set of warnings, and restricted
the second interrogation to a crime that had not been a subject of the earlier
interrogation.
Id. at 105-06.
63 451 U.S. 477 (1981). In Edwards, a man arrested on charges of burglary, robbery
and first-degree murder at first agreed to submit to questioning but soon thereafter
asked to speak to an attorney. Id. at 478-79. The police terminated questioning at that
point, but resumed it on the following day. Id. The subject, who had been warned by a
guard that he must answer questions, confessed to the crimes. Id. The Court ruled that
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opting to further develop the restrictions placed on interrogators
subsequent to a subject's request for counsel.64 Edwards involved
multiple interrogations of a subject concerning one case, and the
Court focused on the voluntariness of the subject's waiver of his
rights, which followed an ungranted request to see an attorney. 65
The Court emphasized two points: first that any waiver of the right
to counsel must be made not only voluntarily but knowingly and
intelligently, 6 6 and second that an initial request for counsel creates
a need for additional safeguards to protect the subject's privilege
against self-incrimination. 67 The Court then established additional
safeguards, holding that:
when an accused has invoked his right to have counsel present during
custodial interrogation, a valid waiver of that right cannot be established by showing only that he responded to further police-initiated
custodial interrogation, even if he has been advised of his rights. We
further hold that an accused, such as Edwards, having expressed his
desire to deal with the police only through counsel, is not subject to
further interrogation by the authorities until counsel has been made
available to him, unless the accused himself initiates68further communication, exchanges, or conversation with the police.
Thus, Edwards created a bar against further interrogation on a specific issue, subsequent to a request for counsel, unless the subject
initiates further contact with the police himself.6 9
In Arizona v. Roberson 70 the Court again considered a question
arising from the Miranda doctrine. Roberson, which involved the assertion of the right to counsel and its applicability to separate cases,
presented aspects of issues which the Court had considered in Edwards and Mosley. 7 1 Like Edwards, Roberson involved further interrogation following an assertion of the right to counsel; 72 like Mosley,
the confession must be suppressed because the man's fifth amendment rights had been
violated. Id. at 487.
64 Id. at 484. The Court acknowledged that it had "strongly indicated that additional
safeguards are necessary when the accused asks for counsel." Id.
65 Id. at 482.
66 Id. The Court stated that "[i]t is reasonably clear under our cases that waivers of
counsel must not only be voluntary, but must also constitute a knowing and intelligent
relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege." Id.
67 Id. at 484. The Court emphasized that "it is inconsistent with Miranda and its
progeny for the authorities, at their insistence, to reinterrogate an accused in custody if
he has clearly asserted his right to counsel." Id. at 485.
68 Id. at 484.
69 Id.
70 108 S.Ct. 2093 (1988).
71 Id. at 2096,2104. For a discussion of the issues in Edwards and Mosley, see supra
notes 63 and 60 respectively.
72 Id. at 2096. Unlike Edwards, the interrogations in Roberson involved unrelated
cases. Id.
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Roberson concerned the application of an assertion of Miranda rights
in one investigation to a subsequent interrogation in a separate investigation. 73 Thus, Roberson presented the Court with a choice be74
tween two strains of decisions derived from the Miranda doctrine.
III.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On April 16,1985, police officers arrested Ronald William Roberson at the scene of a just-completed burglary in Tuscon, Arizona. 75 The arresting officer informed Roberson of his Miranda
rights. 76 At that time Roberson stated that he wished to speak to an
attorney before answering any questions, and the officer made note
of Roberson's assertion of his rights in a written report of the incident. 77 Despite Roberson's request for counsel, police detectives
questioned him at the scene, later that night, and again the follow78
ing day.

On April 18, 1985, Detective Jerry Cota-Robles contacted the
Major Offenders Unit of the Tuscon Police Department to alert
them about a vehicle suspected of having been used in a burglary
committed on April 15, 1985. 79 He spoke to a police officer who
informed him that Roberson had recently been arrested for the
April 16 burglary while in possession of the same car.8 0 Cota-Robles then contacted the officers assigned to the April 16 case and
went with them to question Roberson regarding the April 15
crime.8 1 Up to this time Roberson had not spoken to a lawyer de82
spite his April 16 request for counsel.
Unaware of any previous questioning or assertion of rights,
Cota-Robles began his interrogation by informing Roberson of his
rights under Miranda.8 3 When Roberson indicated that he understood them and wished to answer questions, Cota-Robles turned on
a tape recorder, advised Roberson of his rights again, and pro73 Id. Unlike Mosley, which involved the right to silence, Roberson involved the asser-

tion of the right to counsel. Id.
74 See supra note 11 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Miranda doctrine.
75 Roberson, 108 S. Ct. at 2096.
76 Id.
77 Id.
78 Brief for Petitioner at 4-5, Arizona v. Roberson, 108 S. Ct. 2093 (1988)(No. 87354).
79 Id. at 3.
80 Id.

81 Id.
82 Brief for Respondent at 2, Arizona v. Roberson, 108 S. Ct. 2093 (1988)(No. 87354).
83 Roberson, 108 S. Ct. at 2096. See supra note 11 and accompanying text for a discussion of Miranda.
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ceeded to question him regarding the April 15 burglary.8 4 In the
course of the interrogation, Roberson made what amounted to a full
85
confession to the April 15 crime.
Roberson was later convicted of the April 16 burglary.8 6 In the
April 15 case the defense moved to suppress Roberson's confession
of April 19, basing its request on the fact that the authorities reinitiated questioning without granting Roberson's April 16 request
for counsel, in violation of the rule set forth in Edwards.8 7 The state
protested that the two crimes and their respective interrogations
were unrelated.8 8 The trial court, though it declined to find that the
April 16 violation had tainted the April 19 confession, granted the
suppression order.8 9
The Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed the order and the Arizona Supreme Court denied the state's petition for review. 90 The
United States Supreme Court subsequently granted the state's petition for writ of certiorari to determine whether Roberson's assertion
of his right to counsel in the April 16 investigation should bar the
police from approaching him on the April 15 case. 9 1
IV.
A.

SUMMARY OF THE OPINIONS

THE MAJORITY OPINION

Justice Stevens began the Court's opinion by characterizing the
State of Arizona's petition to overturn the suppression order as a
request that the Court craft an exception to the Edwards rule.9 2 The
Court stated that the state's exception would permit further policeinitiated interrogation subsequent to a request to speak to counsel,
when the questioning involves a separate investigation. 93 The Edwards rule bars police-initiated interrogation following a request to
speak to counsel, until the subject consults an attorney or initiates
further questioning himself.9 4 Rejecting the state's petition, Justice
84

Id.

85 Id.
86 Id.
87 Id. See supra note 63 for a discussion of the Edwards rule.
88 Brief for Petitioner at 5, Arizona v. Roberson, 108 S. Ct. 2093 (1988)(No. 87-354).

89 Roberson, 108 S. Ct. at 2096.
90 Id. at 2097.
91 Id.
92 Roberson, 108 S. Ct. at 2096. Justice Stevens was joined in the majority opinion by
Justices Brennan, White, Marshall, Blackmun, and Scalia. Id. at 2095.
93 Id.
94 Edwards, 451 U.S. at 484. See supra at note 63 and accompanying text for a discus-

sion of Edwards.
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Stevens cited language from State v. Routhier,9 5 a case similar to Roberson, in which the Arizona Supreme Court held that the Edwards rule
applied to require suppression of a confession obtained after a subject's request to see a lawyer, regardless of the fact that the interro96
gation focused on an unrelated issue.
To demonstrate that the Routhier Court properly applied Edwards and permitted suppression of any statements elicited after a
request for counsel, Justice Stevens pointed to the Court's expressed desire in Miranda, to provide "concrete constitutional
guidelines for courts to follow." 9 7 Noting that the Court has often
reiterated the virtue of Miranda's "ease and clarity of ... applica-

tion," 98 Justice Stevens explained that the Edwards rule acts as a corollary to Miranda.9 9 Both rules seek to to mitigate the coercive
nature of custodial interrogation to enable a subject to freely determine whether to answer questions put to him by the authorities.10 0
According to Justice Stevens, the restrictions on interrogation procedures set forth in Miranda and Edwards provide a bright line rule
on custodial questioning, the virtue of which the Court has repeatedly stressed.10 1 The majority opinion concluded that a rule barring
95 137 Ariz. 90, 669 P.2d 68 (1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1073 (1984). Routhier con-

cerned a man arrested on charges of murder and attempted murder. When taken into
custody, the man at first agreed to answer questions but then asked for legal counsel. Id.
at 71-72. Three days after his request, before he had seen a lawyer, an officer approached the man and questioned him regarding an unrelated homicide. Id. In the
course of this interrogation, to which the man had voluntarily submitted, the man confessed to the charges in the first homicide. Id. at 92, 669 P.2d at 71-72.
Justice Stevens analogized Routhier to Roberson, citing Routhier for the proposition
that, "[t]he only difference between Edwards and the appellant is that Edwards was questioned about the same offense after a request for counsel while the appellant was
reinterrogated about an unrelated offense. We do not believe that this factual distinction holds any legal significance for fifth amendment purposes." Roberson, 108 S.Ct. at
2096 (quoting Routhier, 137 Ariz. at 97, 669 P.2d at 75).
96 Routhier, 137 Ariz. at 97, 669 P.2d at 75-76.
97 Roberson, 108 S.Ct. at 2097 (quoting Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 441-42
(1966)).
98 Roberson, 108 S.Ct. at 2097 (quoting Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 425 (1986).
Justice Stevens cited several cases which employed the same language: Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 430 (1984); New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 662-64 (1984); and
Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 718 (1979).
99 Roberson, 108 S.Ct. at 2097.
100 Id.
101 Id. at 2098. Justice Stevens cited several cases in which the Court acknowledged
the "bright-line" rule established in Edwards. In Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625
(1986), the Court noted that it had "freqeuntly emphasized that "one of the characteristics of Edwards is its clear, 'bright-line' quality." Id. at 634. Jackson, a sixth amendment
case, involved two men who were interrogated before they had an opportunity to consult with their appointed counsel. The Court suppressed the confesssions in that case.
Id. at 626.
The cases which Justice Stevens cited to in Roberson, likeJackson, made mention of
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all police-initiated interrogation, following a subject's assertion of
his right to counsel, properly followed from the Court's intention
02
that rules on interrogation procedures should be unambiguous.'
Justice Stevens dismissed the state's argument that the Edwards
rule should not apply to situations in which the subject's request for
counsel arose in a separate investigation.10 3 The majority rejected
the state's attempts to prove their argument based on previous case
law, and to distinguish the factual situation of Roberson from that of
Edwards.'0 4 Dismissing the state's assertion that several cases other
than Edwards controlled in Roberson, Justice Stevens accorded considerable weight to the presumption that a subject's request for
counsel indicates the subject's doubt in his ability to answer questions on any matter without the assistance of an attorney.' 0 5 Addressing the Court's holding in Michigan v. Mosley 10 6 that the
authorities might re-initiate questioning on an unrelated issue after
a significant period of time,10 7 Justice Stevens noted that that case
involved the right to silence, not the right to counsel.10 8 Justice Stevens suggested that the importance of the distinction between Mosley and Roberson lay in the fact that "a subject's decision to cut off
questioning, unlike his request for counsel, does not raise the presumption that he is unable to proceed without a lawyer's advice."' 0 9
In response to the state's suggestion that Roberson's request for
counsel was a limited one similar to the one made by the subject in
Connecticut v. Barrett,"10 Justice Stevens stated that, "as a matter of
law, the presumption raised by a subject's request for counsel-that
he considers himself unable to deal with the pressures of custodial
interrogation without legal assistance-does not disappear simply
the "bright-line" rule while focusing on other issues. In Smith v. Illinois, 469 U.S. 91
(1984), the Court noted that "Edwards set forth a bright-line rule that all questions must
cease" following an assertion of the right to counsel. Id. at 98. Similarly, the Court in
Solem v. Stumes, 465 U.S. 638 (1984), mentioned that, "Edwards established a brightline rule to safeguard existing rights." Id. at 646. Finally, in Oregon v. Bradshaw, 462
U.S. 1039 (1983), the Court commented that Edwards had established, "in effect[,] a
prophylactic rule designed to protect an accused in police custody from being
badgered." Id. at 1044. Justice Stevens, by citing these cases seemed to be strongly
emphasizing the importance the Court places on the clarity of interrogation rules.
102 Roberson, 108 S.Ct. at 2098.
103 Id.
104 Id.
105 Id. at 2099.
106 423 U.S. 96 (1975). See supra at note 60 and accompanying text for a discussion of
Mosly.
107
108

Id. at 104.

Roberson, 108 S.Ct. at 2098-99.
109 Id. at 2099 (quoting Mosley, 423 U.S. at 101 n.7 (White, J., concurring)).
110 479 U.S. 523 (1987). See supra note 44 for a discussion of Barrett.
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because the police have approached the subject, still in custody, still
without counsel, about a separate investigation.""'1
Justice Stevens considered and quickly dismissed the state's attempts to factually distinguish Roberson from Edwards.'" 2 Responding to the state's suggestion that separate investigations necessarily
preclude the threat of leaving a subject open to badgering, Justice
Stevens observed that, "it is by no means clear, though, that police
engaged in separate investigations will be any less eager than police
1 3
involved in only one inquiry to question a suspect in custody."
The majority also rejected the idea that reading a subject a fresh set
of warnings prior to the resumption of questioning would offset any
feelings of coercion to which the subject might have fallen prey
while in custody. 114 The Court concluded that the police violated
Edwards when they questioned Roberson about the second crime,
5
and affirmed the suppression order."1
B.

THE DISSENT

Justice Kennedy began the dissent by criticizing the majority for
characterizing the state's petition as a request that the Court craft an
exception to the Edwards rule."16 The dissent argued that the Edwards rule was the creation of the Court rather than a constitutional
command, and that it therefore fell to the Court to justify its expansion." t7 Justice Kennedy then asserted that such a justification
would prove difficult because the rule laid down by the Court in
Roberson, barring further questioning concerning any investigation
following a subject's assertion of his right to counsel, "is not necessary to protect the rights of suspects, and it will in many instances
deprive our nationwide law enforcement network of a legitimate investigative technique." ' 1 8 Justice Kennedy further assailed the majority opinion for effecting an expansion of the Edwards rule to cover
independent investigations when previous decisions applying that
rule had involved single investigations exclusively." 19
111 Roberson, 108 S. Ct. 2099.
112

113
114
115
116

Id.
Id. at 2100.

Id.
Id. at 2101.
Roberson, 108 U.S. at 2101 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Chief Justice Rehnquist

joined in the dissent. Id.
117 Id. at 2102 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
118Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
119 Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Justice Kennedy cited several cases in which the
Court had applied the Edwards rule: Connecticut v. Barrett, 479 U.S. 523 (1987); Smith
v. Illinois, 469 U.S. 91 (1984); Solem v. Stumes, 465 U.S. 638 (1984); Oregon v. Bradshaw, 462 U.S. 1039 (1983); Wyrick v. Fields, 459 U.S. 42 (1982). All of these cases
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The true focus in Edwards, Justice Kennedy suggested, "is
whether the suspect knows and understands his rights and is willing
to waive them, and whether the courts can be sure that coercion did
not induce the waiver." 12 0 The dissent then considered the majority's fear that permitting further interrogation in separate investigations would lead to badgering, and concluded that because a subject
has the right to terminate subsequent interrogations in the same
manner as he terminates the first, the subject already enjoys sufficient protection from coercion. 12 1 According to Justice Kennedy, a
subject who asserts his right to counsel in an initial interrogation,
and sees that questioning ceases, will understand that he may invoke
the same right in subsequent interrogations and expect the same
22

result.1

The dissent argued that when, as in Edwards, the Court establishes a rule itself rather than drawing that rule directly from the
Constitution, balance between competing interests becomes essential. 123 Justice Kennedy stated that allowing the authorities to question subjects in custody about separate investigations subsequent to
a request for counsel might preserve the rights of suspects without
inhibiting police procedure, thus achieving the requisite balance. 124
The dissent criticized the majority for allowing its focus on maintaining a bright-line rule to cause the Court to draw a line "far more
restrictive than necessary to protect the interests at stake."' 12 5
Finally, Justice Kennedy disputed the majority's assumption
that a request for counsel demonstrates a professed inability to deal
with any questioning absent the presence of an attorney, rather than
a desire for legal advice in a particular situation. 126 The dissent suginvolved interrogation subsequent to a request for counsel, but the subsequent interrogations were limited to the original cases. Id.
120 Roberson, 108 U.S. at 2102 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
121 Id. at 2102-03 (Kennedy,J., dissenting). Justice Kennedy argued that "[w]here the
subsequent questioning is confined entirely to an independent investigation, there is
little risk that the suspect will be badgered into submission." Id. at 2102 (Kennedy, J.,
dissenting).
122 Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Justice Kennedy suggested that "[i]ndeed, the new
warnings and explanations will reinforce his comprehension of a suspect's rights." Id.
(Kennedy, J., dissenting).
123 Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Justice Kennedy stated that, "[b]alance is essential
when the Court fashions rules which are preventative and do not themselves stem from
violations of a constitutional right." Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (quoting Michigan v.
Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 444 (1974)).

Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Justice Kennedy asserted that:
[b]y prohibiting the police from questioning the suspect regarding a separate investigation, the Court chooses to presume that a suspect has made the decision that he

124
125
126
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gested that a more realistic approach would involve informing the
suspect of the second case and allowing the suspect to determine
whether he wished to answer questions. 12 7 In support of that approach, Justice Kennedy pointed to the Court's holdings in Michigan
v.Mosleyl 28 and Maine v. Moulton 12 9 as indicative of the Court's
awareness that suspects' rights could be protected without the need
30
for broad, exclusionary rules, including the Roberson expansion.'
The dissent concluded that the Court should have focused not on
expanding Edwards to establish a rigid rule on interrogation procedure, but should instead have adopted a more flexible rule enabling
courts to analyze the particular circumstances of each case to determine whether a defendant had made a waiver of the right to counsel
voluntarily. 131
V.

ANALYSIS

In Arizona v. Roberson 3 2 the Court established a rule barring police from questioning a subject in custody on any matter, subsequent to the subject's request for counsel, until the subject has seen
an attorney or initiated further contact with the authorities himself. 13 3 The Court based its holding on the desire to protect the
fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination, as expressed in
Miranda and its progeny.' 3 4 The Court reached the correct decision
does not wish to talk about that investigation without counsel present, although that
decision was made when the suspect was unaware of even the existence of a separate invesigation.
Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
127 Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
128 423 U.S. 96 (1975). See supra at note 60 for a discussion of Mosley.
129 474 U.S. 159 (1985). Moulton concerned a confession obtained after the subject
was arraigned and counsel appointed for him. The police elicited a confession by taping
the subject's remarks to a conspirator. Id. at 163-167. The Court held the confession
inadmissable because the subject had already asserted his right to counsel and the surreptitious taping therefore constituted illegal contact. Id. at 176-77.
130 Roberson, 108 S. Ct. at 2103-04 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Justice Kennedy noted

that:
Moulton and Mosley nevertheless reflected an understanding that the invocation of a
criminal suspect's rights could be respected, and opportunities for unfair coercion
restricted, without the establishment of a broad-brush rule by which the assertion of
a right in one investigation is automatically applied to a separate and independent
one.
Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
131 Id. at 2104 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
132 108 S. Ct. 2093 (1988).

133 Id. at 2098.
134 Id. at 2097. In Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436 (1966), the Court described the
fifth amendment privilege as, "fundamental to our system of constitutional rule." Id. at
468. See supra note 11 and accompanying text for a discussion of Miranda and the
Court's holding in that case.

1988]

INTERROGATIONS

693

in Roberson, given the procedural error in that case, but in its zeal to
secure the privilege against self-incrimination the Court imposed an
unwarranted and unnecessary restriction on the authorities' ability
to question suspects. Roberson represents a step in the wrong direction on interrogation regulation. The Court chose a case unrepresentative of proper police procedure and from it promulgated a rule
which both ignores the Court's previous holding on the applicability
of the assertion of Miranda rights to separate investigations,1 3 5 and
denigrates the ability of lower courts to decide the admissibility of
evidence obtained through the legitimate investigative technique of
interrogation.
Justice Stevens advanced three arguments in the majority opinion: first, that the state's petition to overturn the suppression order
constituted a request that the Court craft an exception to the Edwards rule;' 3 6 second, that Roberson established a bright-line rule of
interrogation procedure, thus satisfying a dictate of Miranda that interrogation rules should be unambiguous; 3 7 and third, that the
Roberson rule provides safeguards necessary to protect the privilege
against self-incrimination.13 8 Justice Kennedy, in the dissent, offered three counter-arguments: first, that the Court's ruling in Roberson effected an unjustified expansion of Edwards;'3 9 second, that
the primary concern in Edwards was that any waiver of rights should
be made knowingly as well as voluntarily and that the Roberson expansion was therefore inappropriate; 40 and third, that the Court's
ruling in Roberson amounted to an unjustified presumption of the
135 In Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96 (1975), the Court held an assertion of the right

to silence in an initial interrogation inapplicable to a subsequent interrogation involving
an unrelated investigation. Id. at 104. See supra note 60 and accompanying text for a
discussion of Mosley.
136 Roberson, 108 S. Ct. at 2096. The majority quoted the rule from Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981), "that a suspect who has expressed his desire to deal with
police only through counsel is not subject to further interrogation by the authorities
until counsel has been made available to him, unless the accused himself initiates further
communication, exchanges, or conversations with the police.' " Id. (quoting Edwards,
451 U.S. at 484-85).
137 Roberson, 108 S.Ct. at 2097. Justice Stevens noted that "[a] major purpose of the
Court's opinion in Miranda was to give concrete constitutional guidelines for law enforcement agencies and courts to follow.' " Id. (quoting Miranda,384 U.S. at 441-42) (citations omitted)).
138 Roberson, 108 S. Ct. at 2097. Justice Stevens noted that a primary concern of the
Court since Miranda has been to, "permit a full opportunity to exercise the privilege
against self-incrimination." Id. (quoting Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467).
139 Id. at 2102 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Justice Kennedy stated that, "[t]he majority's
extension of the Edwards rule to separate and independent investigations is unwarranted." Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
140 Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Justice Kennedy asserted that "[o]ur ultimate concern in Edwards, and in the cases which follow it, is whether the suspect knows and un-
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state of mind of custodial subjects. 14 '
Neither the majority nor the dissent suggested a rule which
would further the aim of Miranda: to provide a framework for interrogation which would accord proper respect to the custodial subject's fifth amendment rights without completely devaluing evidence
obtained from interrogation. 42 In fact, the majority and the dissent
ignored or misconstrued previous decisions by the Court which
would have enabled the Court to establish a rule which would respect the privilege against self-incrimination without preventing legitimate police contact with custodial subjects.
In Michigan v. Mosley 14 3 the Court held that the authorities
could approach custodial subjects on unrelated investigations following the assertion of the right to counsel, so long as the authorities "scrupulously honored" the subject's rights on each
occasion.'

44

In Johnson v. Zerbst 145 the Court recognized that lower

courts might look to the "particular facts and circumstances" of individual cases to determine whether a constitutional right had been
violated. 14 6 The Court should have considered these two decisions
in Roberson and established a rule permitting further interrogation
on unrelated issues following a subject's request for counsel, so
long as the subject's rights were respected in each subsequent
interrogation.
The majority described the state's petition as a request that the
Court craft an exception to the Edwards rule; 14 7 the dissent disputed
this characterization and called upon the Court to explain what it
considered an expansion of Edwards.' 48 In determining the relationship of Roberson to Edwards, Justice Stevens and Justice Kennedy
should have considered the relationship of Edwards to the original
derstands his rights and is willing to waive them, and whether courts can be assured that
coercion did not induce the waiver." Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
14' Id. at 2103 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Justice Kennedy stated that "[bly prohibiting
the police from questioning the suspect regarding a separate investigation, the Court
chooses to presume that a suspect has made the decision that he doesn't wish to talk
about that investigation without counsel present." Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
142 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 477. The Court noted in Miranda that "[o]ur decision is not
intended to hamper the traditional function of police officers in investigating crime." Id.
143 423 U.S. 96 (1975). See supra note 60 for a discussion of Mosley.
144 Id. at 104.
145 304 U.S. 458 (1938). See infra note 180 for a discussion of Johnson.
146 Id. at 464.
147 Roberson, 108 S.Ct. at 2096. Justice Stevens noted that such an exception would
apply to "cases in which the police want to interrogate a suspect about an offense that is
unrelated to the subject of their initial interrogation." Id.
148 Id. at 2102 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Justice Kennedy argued that, "the rule of
Edwards is our rule, not a constitutional command; and it is our obligation to justify its
expansion." Id. at 2101-02 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
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Miranda doctrine.
Although Justice Stevens described Edwards as a
"corollary"' 4 9 of Miranda, such language obscures the fact that the
Court clearly considered Edwards to be an expansion of the Miranda
doctrine. 150 The Court specifically noted in Solem v. Stumes' 5 ' that
"Edwards established a new test,"' 15 2 a new restriction, one which interrogators might subsequently be required to adhere to, but one
which they could not have been expected to anticipate. 153 Roberson
constituted a similar expansion of Edwards because it too created a
new restriction on questioning. Roberson applied the Edwards bar to
separate cases; 154 at no time prior to Roberson had the Court considered the applicability of the right to counsel to unrelated investigations.' 5 5 At issue then is whether the Court provided an acceptable
explanation for the Roberson Court's expansion of the Edwards rule.
Justice Stevens suggested that Roberson would set forth with increased clarity the restrictions on interrogators;1 5 6 Justice Kennedy
argued that the Roberson expansion was inappropriate because it
would not further Edwards' aim of ensuring that subjects waive their
rights not only voluntarily but knowingly. 15 7 Justice Stevens argued
that any burden imposed on the authorities through the additional
restriction on questioning would be offset by the benefit to interrogators, courts, and custodial subjects in knowing with greater clarity
158
the limits on attempts to obtain confessions.
The Roberson rule does provide a gain in specificity in that it
149 Id. at 2097. Justice Stevens stated that "[t]he rule of Edwards came as a corollary to
Miranda'sadmonition that '[i]f the individual states that he wants an attorney, the interrogation must cease until an attorney is present.'" Id. (quoting Miranda, 384 U.S. at
474).
150 See infra note 151.
151 465 U.S. 638 (1984). Solem concerned a man arrested for murder who, subsequent
to his request for an attorney, confessed to the crime while in transport to the state
where the murder had taken place. Id. at 640. The Court conceded that Edwards applied
but declined to do so because Solem preceeded the Edwards rule. Id. at 643. The Court
noted that, "Edwards was not a necessary consequence of Miranda." Id. at 648.
152 Id. at 646.
153 Id. at 648. The Court acknowledged that prior to Edwards, "it could justifiably be
believed that a waiver of the right to counsel following its invocation could be voluntary
even if the police initiated the conversation." Id.
154 Roberson, 108 S.Ct. at 2096.
155 Justice Kennedy makes.this point in the dissent, stating that "[t]his is the first time
in which we are asked to apply Edwards to separate and independent investigations." Id.
at 2102 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
156 Id. at 2098. Justice Stevens emphasized that the Edwards rule "serves the purpose
of providing 'clear and unequivocal guidelines,'" and asserted that the Roberson rule
would have the same affect. Id. (quoting Edwards, 451 U.S. at 484-85).
157 Id. at 2102 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Justice Kennedy noted that "[t]hat concern
does not dictate the result reached by the Court today, for the dangers present in Edwards and later cases are insubstantial here." Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
158 Id. at 2098.
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bars police from any contact with a subject subsequent to the subject's request for counsel; it complicates interrogation procedure
though, in that it establishes contrary rules as to the applicability of
the assertion of the right to silence, and the right to counsel, to separate investigations.' 59 Further, Roberson goes too far in its attempt
to combat the coercive atmosphere of custodial interrogation by
prohibiting police contact with the subject altogether. Justice Kennedy, in asserting that Roberson presents no issue as to a subject's
intelligent waiver and therefore constitutes an inappropriate expansion of Edwards,'6 0 erred in failing to see that the question of a subject's intelligent waiver was not the only concern of Edwards. Thus,
the majority opinion and the dissent correctly identified two concerns of the Miranda decision, but erred in seeing their respective
concern as solely determinative of the value of the Roberson decision.
The majority opinion concluded that in order to combat the coercive nature of custodial interrogation, the police should be barred
from any contact with a subject subsequent to the subject's assertion
of his right to counsel; 16 1 the dissent suggested that in so concluding the majority in effect presumed to read the minds of custodial
subjects. 162 Justice Stevens asserted that a subject's will might
quickly be suborned if he were repeatedly asked to assert his fifth
amendment rights as the authorities approached him on different
issues. 163
Justice Kennedy offered a more realistic scenario, suggesting
that if a subject asserted his rights in one case and observed that
they were respected, he would understand that he might assert his
rights in subsequent interrogations and expect the same result.'6
The dissent argued that police should be allowed to inform subjects
159 Mosley established that police could approach subjects on unrelated investigations

following an assertion of the right to silence. Mosley, 423 U.S. at 104. Roberson holds
that police may not approach subjects on any matter following an assertion of the right
to counsel. Roberson, 108 S. Ct. at 2098.
160 Roberson, 108 S. Ct. at 2102 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
161 Id. at 2100. Justice Stevens stated that, "to a suspect who has indicated his inability to cope with the pressures of custodial interrogation by requesting counsel, any further interrogation without counsel having been provided will surely exacerbate whatever
compulsion to speak the suspect may be feeling." Id.
162 Id. at 2103 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Justice Kennedy wrote of the majority opinion that "[t]he underlying premise seems to be that there are two types of people: those
who never talk without a lawyer and those who always talk without a lawyer." Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting). The dissent criticized this presumtion as unrealistic. Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
163 Id. at 2100. The majority stated that, "we also disagree with petitioner's contention that fresh sets of Miranda warnings will 'reassure' a suspect who has been denied the
counsel he has clearly requested that his rights will remain untrammeled." Id.
164 Id. at 2103 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Justice Kennedy suggested that "[i]ndeed,
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of subsequent interrogations and permit the subjects to decide for
themselves whether to assert or waive their privilege against selfincrimination.1 6 5 The dissent's suggestion that the assertion of fifth
amendment rights should apply to individual cases only and not to
166
unrelated investigations fits within the Court's holding in Mosley.
In Mosley the Court held that when a custodial subject had asserted his right to silence, the authorities might approach him after
16 7
a significant period of time to question him on unrelated issues.
Mosley placed particular emphasis on the proper administration of
interrogation procedure in each subsequent interrogation, noting
that "the admissability of statements obtained after the person in
custody has decided to remain silent depends under Miranda on
whether his right to cut off questioning was 'scrupulously
honored.' "168 The Court in Mosley reaffirmed its belief that the Miranda rule "counteracts the coercive pressure of the custodial
setting."169
Although Mosley represents the Court's only ruling on the applicability of the assertion of Miranda rights to separate cases, the ma-

170
jority and the dissent accorded Mosley little weight in Roberson.

Justice Stevens and Justice Kennedy distinguished Mosley on the
grounds that it addressed the right to silence rather than the right to
counsel. 1 7 1 This unprofitable distinction led the Court to pass over

the sound reasoning of Mosley unnecessarily, when that reasoning
the new warnings and explanation will reinforce his comprehension of a suspect's
rights." Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
165 Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Justice Kennedy argued that "[t]he more realistic
view of human nature suggests that a suspect will want the opportunity, when he learns
of separate investigations, to decide whether he wishes to speak to the authorities in a
particular investigation without representation." Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
166 See Roberson, 108 S. Ct. at 2102 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). In Michigan v. Mosley,
423 U.S. 96 (1975), the Court stated that approaching a custodial subject to interrogate
him on an unrelated case following his assertion of the right to silence in a previous
interrogation, "did not violate the principles of Miranda v. Arizona." Id. at 107. See
supra note 60 and accompanying text for a discussion of Mosley and the Court's holding
in that case.
167 Mosley, 108 S. Ct. at 107. The Court emphasized the fact that the police in Mosley,
"resumed questioning only after the passage of a significant period of time and the provision of a fresh set of warnings." Id. at 106.
168 Id. at 104.
169 Id.
170 Justice Stevens noted that "as Mosley made clear, a suspect's decision to cut off
questioning, unlike his request for counsel, does not raise the presumption that he is
unable to proceed without a lawyer's advice." Roberson 108 U.S. at 2099 (citing Mosley,
423 U.S. at 101 n.7). Justice Kennedy conceded that Mosley didn't necessarily control in
Roberson because "Mosley involved the Fifth Amendment right to silence, while this case
involves the Fifth Amendment right to counsel." Id. at 2104 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
171 Roberson, at 2099 and 2104 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
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might have formed the basis for a better rule than the one the Court
established in Roberson. The Court has previously acknowledged
that "much of the logic and language of [Mosley] could be applied"
to the right to counsel. 17 2 Further, a consistent rule as to the applicability of the assertion of Miranda rights to unrelated investigations
would serve to simplify interrogation procedural rules; the Court
has emphasized, in Roberson in particular, the importance of estab73
lishing clear, unambiguous rules of interrogation.1
In Roberson the Court missed the opportunity to set forth a consistent rule of applicability, and the chance to reaffirm the validity of
the Miranda system of warnings as it had done in Mosley. 17 4 Instead,
the Court adopted a rule barring all police contact with a subject
after the subject's assertion of his right to counsel.1 7 5 While the
Court's rule would properly answer situations like Roberson, in which
the subject received no indication that his rights would be
respected, 76 the Court went too far. The Court erred in establishing a general rule based on a case of procedural error; a more logical rule would be based on the proper observation of Miranda in
custodial interrogations and would be flexible enough to address
exceptional cases like Roberson. 177 Mosley set forth a rule on the applicability of the assertion of the privilege against self-incrimination
to separate cases, in which the authorities observed proper interrogation procedure. 178 The challenge for the Court should have been
172 Solem v. Stumes, 465 U.S. at 648 (1984).
173 Justice Stevens noted that the Court has, "repeatedly emphasized the virtues of a
bright-line rule." Roberson, 108 S. Ct. at 2098. In fact, some Justices have criticized
decisions which sacrificed clarity to other concerns. For instance, in New York v.

Quarles, 467 U.S. 649 (1984), Justice O'Connor criticized the Court's establishment of
an exception to the Miranda rule in situations in which public safety might be jeopardized, arguing that, "a 'public safety' exception unnecessarily blurs the edges of the clear
line heretofore established and makes Miranda's requirements more difficult to understand." Id. at 663 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
174 Mosley, 423 U.S. at 104. The Court specifically stated that adherence to Miranda
offsets any "coercive pressures of the custodial setting." Id.
175 Roberson, 108 S. Ct. at 2096.
176 Brief for Petitoner at 4, Arizona v. Roberson, 108 S. Ct. 2093 (1988)(No. 87-354).
Police officers interrogated Roberson on the same case after he asserted his right to
counsel. Id.
177 While the majority did not comment on the unusual fact situation in Roberson,Justice Kennedy did note that, "the conduct of the police in this case was hardly exemplary;
they reinitiated questioning of the respondent regarding the first investigation after he
had asserted his right to counsel in that investigation." Roberson, 108 S. Ct. at 2103
(Kennedy, J., dissenting).
178 Mosley, 423 U.S. at 104. The Court devoted considerable attention to the fact that
proper procedure was followed in Mosley. The majority noted that "[a] review of the
circumstances leading to Mosley's confession reveals that his 'right to cut off questioning' was fully respected in this case." Id.
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to develop a means for courts to examine, as dictated by Miranda,
whether authorities had followed proper procedure in individual
cases, thus ensuring that a subject's rights had been "fully
79
honored."
In fact the Court has long recognized that courts might look to
the particular circumstances of individual cases to determine
whether a subject's constitutional rights had been violated. In Johnson v. Zerbst,'8 0 a case involving the sixth amendment right to counsel, the Court held that, "the determination of whether there has
been an intelligent waiver of the right to counsel must depend, in
each case, upon the particular circumstances of that case."''
The
Court has recognized the applicabilty of the "particular circum8 2
stances" test to the privilege against self-incrimination.
A rule adopting the Mosley doctrine and applying it to the right
to counsel would hold that police might interrogate custodial subjects on unrelated issues following an assertion of the right to counsel. The rule would also establish that courts should examine each
case to determine whether authorities have observed proper procedure. Because the inquiry would focus on procedure, the courts
would not need to make determinations as to whether the subject
had faced a coercive atmosphere; the Court has already established
a presumption of coercion when Miranda is not followed, 18 3 and a
corollary presumption that the proper observance of Miranda counU.S. at 467.
180 304 U.S. 458 (1938). Johnson involved the sixth amendment right to counsel. In
179 Miranda, 384

that case a man arrested for passing counterfeit bills was arrested and tried without
benefit of counsel. Id. at 460. The Court overturned the conviction and directed the
district court to examine whether the man had made a valid waiver of counsel. Id. at
469.
181 Id. at 464.
182 In Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298 (1985), the Court noted that in determining the
validity of a waiver of rights courts "must examine the surrounding circumstances and
the entire course of police conduct with respect to the suspect in evaluating the voluntariness of his statements." Id. at 318. The Court made a similar comment in Edwards,
again noting that the determination of the validity of a waiver depends, "in each case
'upon the particular facts and circumstances surrounding that case.' " Edwards, 451 U.S.
at 482 (quotingJohnson, 308 U.S. at 464). In Wyrick v. Fields the Court underscored the
point again, noting that Edwards required an examination of the "totality of circumstances" to determine whether the provision of Miranda warnings had been meaningfully timed. Wyrick, 459 U.S. at 47. The Court applied the "particular circumstances"
holding ofJohnson yet again in Oregon v. Bradshaw, 462 U.S. 1039 (1983), a case involving the issue of whether a defendant had made a waiver knowingly and intelligently. Id.
at 1046.
183 Miranda states that "unless and until such warnings and waiver are demonstrated
by the prosecution at trial, no evidence obtained as a result of interrogation can be
used." Miranda, 384 U.S. at 479.
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teracts "the coercive pressures of the custodial setting."' 8 4
Notably, the adoption of this rule would require that the suppression order in Roberson be affirmed. Because Roberson involved
substantial procedural error, a court would necessarily find the confession to be the product of a coercive atmosphere and therefore
inadmissible. The difference between this suggested rule and the
one that the Court adopted in Roberson is that this more flexible rule
would achieve the goal of protecting the privilege against self-incrimination without restricting the legitimate investigative technique of interrogation unnecessarily.
VI.

CONCLUSION

The rule that the Court adopted in Roberson bars police officers
from any contact with a custodial subject on any matter once the
subject has asserted his right to counsel. This rule ignores the
Court's previous holding on the applicability of the assertion of the
privilege of self-incrimination to unrelated investigations. Further,
it disparages the ability of lower courts to determine the admissibility of evidence derived from interrogation.
The Court has chosen a case in which proper procedure as defined by Miranda v. Arizona 18 5 was not followed, and from it promulgated an unnecessarily restrictive rule. The Court should have
adopted a more flexible rule which would allow for the admission of
evidence obtained through the correct observance of Miranda, yet
exclude confessions elicited through procedural error.
PATRICK

184 Mosley, 423 U.S. at 104.
185 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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